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Abstract:
In this paper I examine the relation be-
tween copyright and aggression from 
the anarcho-capitalist perspective. I hy-
pothesise that notwithstanding ubiqui-
tous beliefs, copyright does not protect 
individuals’ property and freedom; on 
the contrary, copyright, as well as oth-
er types of intellectual property, initi-
ates aggressive violence against people’s 
property and freedom being thereby an 
instance of aggression, not remedy there-
of. The function of norms of conduct is to 
eliminate conflicts over scarce resourc-
es. If a given norm of conduct, such as 
copyright, itself produces scarcity where 
there was none before, conflicts and in-
consistencies will result. 
1. Introduction
In the present paper I deliver a politico-
philosophical argument against intel-
lectual property, particularly against 
copyright. The criticism I provide here 
is based on the anarcho-capitalist politi-
cal philosophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe 
and the theory of intellectual property 
developed by Stephan Kinsella. My main 
research problem is the following ques-
tion: What is the relation between the in-
stitution of copyright and aggression? It 
is a ubiquitous belief that the institution 
of copyright protects original authors’ 
property against violation (aggression). 
Notwithstanding these common believes, 
the main thesis of the paper is the follow-
ing assertion: Copyright is an instance 
of aggression. Many libertarian think-
ers endorse the idea that the institution 
of intellectual property is incompatible 
with private property and consists in 
violation thereof. In this paper I present 
the libertarian case against the institu-
tion of intellectual property and provide 
philosophical background for this criti-
cism by elaborating on the relations be-
tween freedom, private property and ag-
gression; particularly, I highlight the link 
which connects the fact of scarcity with 
the possibility of conflicts and demon-
strate how this link influences the ques-
tion of rights and aggression.
To investigate my research problem 
I employ both the case-based method 
that reasons by analogy with paradig-
matic cases1 and the method of reflective 
1 On the case-based method see: S.E. Toul-
min, A.R. Jonsen, The Abuse of Casuistry, Uni-
versity of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles 
1989, p. 323–324, passim; S.E. Toulmin, The Uses 
of Argument, Cambridge University Press, New York 
2008, p. 87–109, passim; J.F. Childress, Methods 
in Bioethics, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, 
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equilibrium that examines relations be-
tween sets of assertions2. 
2. The Libertarian Case Against 
Copyright
Commencing with the libertarian case 
against copyright, I will provide grounds 
for a fully-fl edged philosophical argu-
ment for my thesis. Let’s then consider 
the following series of thought experi-
ments. Imagine that you have a luxuri-
ous wrist watch. You wear the watch on 
every occasion and proudly so. During 
your usual afternoon stroll a pickpocket 
silently approaches you and steals your 
wrist watch. What is the effect of the 
pickpocket’s action as far as your pri-
vate property is concerned? It is simple: 
legitimate property that you had before 
(the wrist watch) has been taken from 
you without your consent and you do 
not have it any more. The pickpocket’s 
action constitutes an instance of private 
property violation: the property that you 
had before has been taken from you (sto-
len, destroyed, diminished etc.) without 
your consent. This simple story repre-
B. Steinbock (ed.), Oxford University Press, New 
York 2007, p. 29–34.
2 On the method of refl ective equilibrium 
see: N. Daniels, Wide Refl ective Equilibrium and 
Theory Acceptance in Ethics, “The Journal of Phi-
losophy” 1979, Vol. 76, No. 5; D.W. Haslett, What 
Is Wrong With Refl ective Equilibria?, “Philosophical 
Quarterly” 1987, No. 37/148; J. Rawls, Outline of 
a Decision Procedure for Ethics, “The Philosophi-
cal Review” 1951, Vol. 60, No. 2; J.D. Arras, The 
Way We Reason Now: Refl ective Equilibrium in 
Bioethics, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics,
B. Steinbock (ed.), Oxford University Press, New 
York 2007; N. Daniels, Refl ective Equilibrium, [in:] 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 
2011; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 1971; R. Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, Bloomsbury Academic, London 
2013; Ł. Dominiak, Metoda równowagi refl eksyjnej 
[refl ective equilibrium] w fi lozofi i polityki, “Athenae-
um. Polskie Studia Politologiczne” 2012, No. 36.
sents of course the paradigmatic case of 
private property rights violation: theft. 
Now imagine a different story. You 
wrote a very good paper. Being proud 
of it, you keep the journal with your pa-
per exposed on a shelf in your fl at. Your 
academic challenger copies some parts 
of your paper and publish it under his 
name. This simple story represents the 
paradigmatic case of intellectual prop-
erty violation: plagiarism. But what is 
the effect of the plagiarists’ action? You 
still have the journal with your paper on 
the shelf. It has not been taken from you. 
Nor have the ideas expressed in your 
paper been taken from you. Everything 
you had before the plagiarist copied your 
paper is still yours: the physical journal 
with your paper on your shelf, the ideas 
expressed in your paper, the patterns of 
words in which you expressed the ideas. 
Hence, the plagiarist’s action does not 
constitute an instance of private proper-
ty violation, let alone theft: the property 
you had before (the journal with your pa-
per on your shelf, the ideas, the patterns 
of words) has not been taken from you 
without your consent. As Stephan Kin-
sella noticed, “if you copy a book I have 
written, I still have the original (tangible) 
book, and I also still ‘have’ the pattern 
of words that constitute the book. Thus, 
authored works are not scarce in the 
same sense that a piece of land or a car 
are scarce. If you take my car, I no longer 
have it. But if you ‘take’ a book-pattern 
and use it to make your own physical 
book, I still have my own copy”3. 
Our possible opponent could disa-
gree with this conclusion on the basis 
that when the plagiarist from our story 
copies the paper, he steals something 
from the author, namely he steals the 
3 S. Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2008, p. 32.
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value of the paper. If copyright were 
abode by, the author would gain fi nan-
cial and other profi ts (colleagues’ ad-
miration, social status, fame etc.) from 
selling copies of the paper and being its 
exclusive author. Hence, the plagiarist’s 
action constitutes an instance of “prop-
erty” violation: the “property” the author 
had before, namely the value of the pa-
per, has been taken from him (dimin-
ished) without his consent. In a word, by 
copying the paper, the plagiarist steals 
the value of the paper. The position that 
property rights are about creating val-
ues and that any diminution of value of 
things constitutes therefore an infringe-
ment on property rights is espoused for 
example by objectivist thinkers. For in-
stance, Ayn Rand points out that “by 
forbidding an unauthorized reproduc-
tion of the object, the law declares, in ef-
fect, that the physical labor of copying 
is not the source of the object’s value, 
that that value is created by the origi-
nator of the idea and may not be used 
without his consent; thus the law estab-
lishes the property right of a mind to that 
which is has brought into existence”4. 
Also David Kelley expresses this value-
based theory of property rights when he 
says that “the essential basis of property 
rights lies in the phenomenon of creating
value”5. 
Unfortunately, this reply would have 
the extremely paradoxical implications. 
Consider another story. Imagine that 
you run a distillery. You sell whisky and 
you are very successful businessman. 
Your neighbour realises how successful 
you are and opens a winery next to your 
4 A. Rand, Patents and Copyrights, in Capi-
talism: The Unknown Ideal, New American Library, 
New York 1967, p. 130.
5 D. Kelley, Intellectual Property Rights. Re-
sponse to Stephan Kinsella, „Institute of Objectivist 
Studies Journal”, vol. 5, no. 2, 1995, p. 13.
distillery. He starts to sell wine. Some 
of your existing customers sometimes 
prefer to drink wine rather than whisky. 
You see that you are losing customers 
on behalf of your neighbour. The value 
of your whisky business drops because 
of your neighbour’s actions. To stay in 
the business you have to considerably 
lower the price of your whisky to com-
pete with your neighbour for custom-
ers. But this again means that the value 
of your distillery plummets because of 
your neighbour’s actions. However, your 
neighbour did not commit any immoral 
act, let alone a breach of law or crime. He 
just used his property to open his own 
business. Your neighbour did not violate 
your tangible property. He did not steal 
your whisky nor interfered with your dis-
tillery. Yet he, the same as the plagiarist, 
diminished the value of your property. 
Any free market competition dimin-
ishes value of goods and services offered 
for purchase on the market. If the sup-
ply of a given good increases, the price 
(the value) of this good decreases. If one 
would like to protect the value of tangi-
ble goods against diminution, one would 
have to oppose any free market competi-
tion, being thereby involved in violation 
of individuals’ freedom and private prop-
erty rights. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe 
points out, “it is easy to recognize that 
nearly every action of an individual can 
alter the value (price) of someone else’s 
property. For example, when person 
A enters the labor or the marriage mar-
ket, this may change the value of B in 
these markets. And when A changes his 
relative valuations of beer and bread, or 
if A himself decides to become a brewer 
or baker, this changes the value of the 
property of other brewers and bakers. 
According to the view that value damage 
constitutes a rights violation, A would be 
committing a punishable offense vis-à-
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vis brewers or bakers”6. As this line of 
argument clearly demonstrates, the pol-
icy of protecting value of tangible goods 
that the institution of intellectual prop-
erty (according to our possible opponent) 
is based on violates individuals’ freedom 
and property rights and therefore is an 
instance of aggression. 
Our possible opponent could try to 
defend his position by singling out in-
tellectual property as the only instance 
where the protection of value is justifi ed. 
But such a strategy would equal sur-
render. This would mean that protecting 
value of tangible goods in general vio-
lates individuals’ freedom and property 
rights but in one special case it is alleg-
edly justifi ed notwithstanding this viola-
tion. That would straightaway confi rm 
my thesis. So, to argue that intellectual 
property does not violate individuals’ 
freedom and property, our opponent has 
to fi nd different criterion than the pro-
tection of value.
He could try to claim that property 
violation does not consists only in steal-
ing, destroying, diminishing or, generally 
speaking, expropriating but also in using 
property in a way that is not permitted 
by the owner. He could argue that the 
author of the paper or the owner of copy-
right sells the paper only conditionally, 
i.e. with the restriction that the paper 
cannot be copied; that the owner sells 
only part of his property rights to the pa-
per. This is a position more or less rep-
resented by Murray Rothbard. Rothbard 
formulates his argument in favour of in-
tellectual property in the following way: 
“Suppose that Brown allows Green into 
his home and shows him an invention 
of Brown’s hitherto kept secret, but only 
6 H.-H. Hoppe, The Great Fiction. Property, 
Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Lais-
sez Faire Books, Baltimore 2012, p. 15.
on the condition that Green keeps this 
information private. In that case, Brown 
has granted to Green not absolute own-
ership of the knowledge of his invention, 
but conditional ownership, with Brown 
retaining the ownership power to dis-
seminate the knowledge of the invention. 
If Green discloses the invention anyway, 
he is violating the residual property right 
of Brown to disseminate knowledge of 
the invention, and is therefore to that 
extent a thief”7. At fi rst glance this argu-
ment seems persuasive. There are many 
tangible goods that are sold only condi-
tionally. For example some breeds of ani-
mals are sold under condition that they 
will not serve as sires; also real estate 
is subject to many conditions limiting 
property rights of the purchaser etc. In 
a word, it can be stipulated in the pur-
chase contract that only some property 
rights to a given good are being sold and 
if both parties of the contract agree on 
it, there is by defi nition no violation of 
freedom or property rights. Unfortunate-
ly, this analogy is far-fetched as far as 
such intangible goods as these protected 
by copyright are concerned. Consider the 
following line of argument.
If I buy a house that I cannot sell 
until fi ve years pass under the sanction 
that I will be burdened with extra pay-
ments, this limitation of my property 
rights pertains only to this very house. If 
somebody else sees my house and builds 
a very similar house of his own, he is 
not bound by the purchase contract that 
I signed with regard to my house. Simi-
larly, if I contractually agree that the cat 
I buy will not serve as sire, this contract 
is binding only as far as me, the seller 
and this very cat are concerned. If some-
body else sees my cat and obtains a very 
7 M. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, New 
York University Press, New York 1998, p. 123.
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similar cat from other source, he is not 
bound by the contract that I signed. In-
tellectual property works utterly differ-
ently. If I buy a paper protected by copy-
right, it is not only me who is allegedly 
bound by the contract with the copyright 
owner but also any other person who 
does not buy the paper nor borrows it 
etc. If somebody else sees my paper or 
listens to the conversation about its con-
tent etc. and copies it, he also infringes 
on copyright. Here the analogy with the 
real contracts and tangible property col-
lapses. Copyright does not place con-
tractual duties on the parties of contract 
but imposes obligations on people who 
have never signed any contract with cop-
yright owners, not even the implicit one. 
As Stephan Kinsella points out, “even 
if a seller of an object could somehow 
‘reserve’ certain use-rights with respect 
to the sold object, how does this pre-
vent third parties from using informa-
tion apparent from or conveyed in that 
object? Reserved rights proponents say 
more than that the immediate buyer B1 
is bound not to reproduce the book; for 
this result could be obtained by pointing 
to the implicit contract between seller 
A and buyer B1. Let us consider a third 
party, T1, who fi nds and reads the aban-
doned book, thus learning the informa-
tion in it. Alternatively, consider third 
party T2, who never has possession of or 
even sees the book; he merely learns of 
the information in the book from gossip, 
graffi ti, unsolicited e-mail, and so forth. 
Neither T1 nor T2 has a contract with 
A, but both now possess certain knowl-
edge. Even if the book somehow does not 
contain within it a ‘right to reproduce,’ 
how can this prevent T1 and T2 from 
using their own knowledge? And even if 
we say that T1 is somehow “bound” by 
a contractual copyright notice printed 
on the book (an untenable view of con-
tract), how is T2 bound by any contract 
or reserved right?”8. Hence, copyright 
cannot be construed in terms of contrac-
tual duties. These though are the only 
one which do not violate people’s private 
property. Imposing uncontractual duties 
on individuals by defi nition constitutes 
an invasion on their freedom and prop-
erty rights. 
This broken analogy with tangible 
property reveals the most important 
feature of the institution of intellectual 
property, especially of the copyright: the 
fact that copyright directly violates in-
dividuals’ freedom and property rights. 
From the moment I publish a paper that 
is protected by copyright, you are not 
allowed to use your tangible property, 
i.e. your paper, computer, printer, ink, 
brain, hands etc., in a way that infringes 
on my copyright; from this moment on 
I am an owner of a part of your property. 
Again Kinsella writes: “ownership of ide-
al rights gives the IP owner some degree 
of control—ownership—over the tangible 
property of innumerable others. Patent 
and copyright invariably transfer partial 
ownership of tangible property from its 
natural owner to innovators, inventors, 
and artists”9. Even though you appropri-
ated your tangible property before I wrote 
my paper and even though you did it in 
a legitimate way, without violating any-
one’s rights, I become an owner of a part 
of your tangible property without your 
consent: you are expropriated by me to 
the extent my copyright holds. I did not 
buy your property rights to your printer, 
ink or computer, you did not give it to me 
as a free gift. I became an owner of a part 
of your property without your consent, 
just by the act of writing something that 
you are not even interested in. Since one 
8 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 51.
9 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 15.
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can legitimately appropriate an item only 
in two ways, viz. either by homesteading 
it or by free exchange, then if one be-
comes an owner of an item in some other 
way, it constitutes a form of theft. In this 
sense copyright is not a way of protect-
ing individuals’ private property but of 
expropriating people and violating their 
property rights. 
3. Freedom, Private Property and 
Aggression
Political philosophy knows a conundrum 
concerning the boundaries of personal 
freedom. The conundrum consists in 
delineating the boundaries of personal 
freedom in such a way to avoid an over-
lap of individuals’ spheres of freedom 
and the resultant confl ict between peo-
ple. The most famous attempt to solve 
this conundrum is Isaiah Berlin’s theory 
of negative liberty according to which 
“I am normally said to be free to the de-
gree to which no human being interferes 
with my activity. Political liberty in this 
sense is simply the area within which 
a man can do what he wants”10 (or “the 
area within which a man can act unob-
structed by others”11). The problem with 
Berlin’s solutions as well as with many 
others is that, notwithstanding the ap-
pearances, they do not help to avoid con-
fl icts between people nor delineates the 
respective spheres of personal freedom 
whatsoever. An example (different than 
copyright which would also be apt in 
this case) will suffi ce here. If I viciously 
disseminate a false and derogatory in-
formation about you that prevent you 
from getting a job that you would oth-
erwise have got, you do not act “unob-
10 I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1958, p. 7.
11 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1969, p. 122.
structed by others” nor can you “do what 
you want” because I “interfere with your 
activity”. However, if you wanted to stop 
me for instance by suing me for slander, 
you would “interfere with my activity” of 
gossiping and I would be obstructed by 
you. There could be some considerations 
of greater good or lesser evil but the fact 
would still remain the same: my freedom 
of speech would be encroached by you. 
Similarly, if I disseminate derogatory 
information about you, I interfere with 
your activity and obstruct your actions. 
Whichever direction we move, the viola-
tion of freedom construed in a Berlinian 
way will result. As we see then, Berlin’s 
criterion does not delineate the respec-
tive spheres of personal freedom and 
therefore does not help to avoid confl icts 
between people. Why is it so? Because 
the praxeological condition of possibil-
ity of confl ict between people is the fact 
of scarcity. Confl icts can take place only 
over scarce goods. If “all external goods 
were available in superabundance, if 
they were ‘free goods’, such as the air 
that we breathe is normally a ‘free’ good, 
if whatever one did with these goods, his 
actions had repercussions neither with 
respect to his own future supply of such 
goods, nor with regard to the present or 
future supply of the same goods for oth-
ers (and vice versa), it would be impossi-
ble that there could ever be a confl ict be-
tween people concerning the use of such 
goods. A confl ict becomes possible only 
if goods are scarce”12. Hence, a theory of 
freedom, justice, property rights or, gen-
erally speaking, a norm of conduct not 
only has to allow for avoiding confl icts 
over already scarce goods but also can-
not itself generate such scarcity. Reputa-
12 H.-H. Hoppe, Economics and Ethics of Pri-
vate Property. Studies in Political Economy and Phi-
losophy, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2012, 
p. 381.
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tion is not a scarce good though. If A has 
an opinion about C it does not mean that 
B cannot have the same opinion about C. 
By treating reputation as a scarce good, 
Berlin’s theory of freedom not only does 
not allow for avoiding confl icts but gen-
erates scarcity where there was none be-
fore and therefore induces confl icts over 
these artifi cially scarce goods. It means 
that Berlin’s criterion, the same as the 
institution of intellectual property, can-
not serve as a norm of conduct because 
“it is the purpose of norms to help avoid 
otherwise unavoidable confl ict. A norm 
that generates confl ict rather than help-
ing to avoid it is contrary to the very pur-
pose of norms. It is a dysfunctional norm 
or a perversion”13.
This politico-philosophical conun-
drum has been solved satisfactorily by 
libertarian criterion of personal freedom. 
According to libertarianism, liberty is un-
derstood in terms of private property. It 
means that I am free as far as my private 
property is not violated, provided I do 
not violate your private property. Murray 
Rothbard explains “how the libertarian 
defi nes the concept of ‘freedom’ or ‘lib-
erty’. Freedom is a condition in which 
a person’s ownership rights in his own 
body and his legitimate material prop-
erty are not invaded, are not aggressed 
against. A man who steals another man’s 
property is invading and restricting the 
victim’s freedom, as does the man who 
beats another over the head. Freedom 
and unrestricted property right go hand 
in hand. On the other hand, to the lib-
ertarian, ‘crime’ is an act of aggression 
against a man’s property right, either in 
his own person or his materially owned 
objects. Crime is an invasion, by the use 
of violence, against a man’s property and 
13 H.-H. Hoppe, The Great..., p. 161.
therefore against his liberty”14. Hence, if 
the libertarian (or anyone else’s) crite-
rion of delineating respective spheres of 
personal freedom is to be able to avoid 
confl icts and overlaps, its construal of 
private property must itself preclude the 
possibility of confl icts and overlaps. It 
means that for the boundaries of liberty 
to be clearly delineated, the boundaries 
of private property also has to be clearly 
delineated, visible and objective. To boot, 
since the source of any confl ict is the 
scarcity of goods, the institution of pri-
vate property cannot itself generate such 
a scarcity.
That is why the institution of private 
property can concern only physical re-
sources. First of all, only physical goods 
are naturally scarce, so a confl ict over 
them can arise. If confl ict can arise, then 
there is a need for norms that establish 
confl ictless ways of dealing with these 
scarce goods: this is the role of private 
property rights. Second of all, if proper-
ty rights concern only naturally scarce 
physical resources, they do not them-
selves create scarcity and therefore they 
do not themselves generate confl icts. 
Third, because the borders between 
physical goods are objective and visible, 
the possibility of blunders is essentially 
non-existent; therefore it is easy for peo-
ple to say in advance what constitutes 
the violation of property rights. As Hans-
Hermann Hoppe writes, “it is some sort 
of technical necessity for any theory of 
property (not just the natural position 
described here) that the delimitation of 
the property rights of one person against 
those of another be formulated in physi-
cal, objective, intersubjectively ascer-
tainable terms. Otherwise it would be 
14 M. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The 
Libertarian Manifesto, Macmillan Publishing, New 
York 2002, p. 41.
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impossible for an actor to determine ex 
ante if any particular action of his were 
an aggression or not, and so the social 
function of property norms (any property 
norms), i.e., to make a confl ict—free in-
teraction possible, could not be fulfi lled 
simply for technical reasons”15. 
Unfortunately, neither of these con-
ditions is fulfi lled in the case of the in-
stitution of intellectual property. First of 
all, as I demonstrated above, ideas and 
their expressions are not scarce. If A has 
pattern P expressing idea I and if B cop-
ies pattern P, A still has both pattern P 
and idea I. Second of all, since ideas and 
patterns are not naturally scarce and 
intellectual property rights nonetheless 
protect them, they by necessity create an 
artifi cial scarcity. As Stephan Kinsella 
points out, “by recognizing a right in an 
ideal object, one creates scarcity where 
none existed before”16. But if intellectual 
property in general and copyright in par-
ticular create scarcity and if scarcity is 
the praxeological condition of possibility 
of confl icts, intellectual property does not 
help to avoid confl icts but to create them. 
Therefore intellectual property rights are 
dysfunctional norms and perversion of 
justice. Third, the borders between intel-
lectual property are blurred, ambiguous, 
arbitrary and subjective. There has not 
been probably other case in the history 
of law (besides trial by ordeal) where the 
answer to the question of what consti-
tutes an illegal act would be even in ten 
percent so intricate and arbitrary as in 
the case of intellectual property law. It 
is vague what is protected, how many 
“chunks” of this ideal “something” is 
enough to constitute intellectual proper-
ty and correspondingly to constitute vio-
15 H.-H. Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and 
Capitalism, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 
2012, p. 23.
16 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 33.
lation thereof etc. So, Stephan Kinsella 
writes that the institution of intellectual 
property “almost invariably protects only 
certain types of creations—unless, that 
is, every single useful idea one comes up 
with is subject to ownership. But the dis-
tinction between the protectable and the 
unprotectable is necessarily arbitrary”17. 
Intellectual property “involves arbitrary 
distinctions with respect to what class-
es of creations deserve protection, and 
concerning the length of the term of the 
protection”18 and “has no moorings to ob-
jective borders of actual, tangible prop-
erty, and thus is inherently vague, amor-
phous, ambiguous, and subjective”19. 
Finally, we have come to the ques-
tion of aggression. The same as in the 
case of the concept of freedom, the con-
cept of aggression hinges upon the clear 
construal of private property. Libertarian 
political philosophy defi nes aggression 
in general terms as violence against pri-
vate property. First of all, since property 
is understood as tangible property, ag-
gression means only physical violence or 
“invasion of the physical integrity of an-
other person’s property”20. Second of all, 
the category of property is broadly con-
strued within libertarianism, i.e. it refers 
on the one hand to person’s body and 
then is covered by the principle of self-
ownership and, on the other hand, to 
external tangible resources and then is 
covered by the principle of homesteading 
and free exchange. Similarly, aggression 
is understood as both violence against 
person’s body and violence against per-
son’s external tangible property. As Ste-
phan Kinsella points out, “libertarians 
tend to elaborate or defi ne the non-ag-
gression principle in a somewhat coun-
17 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 23.
18 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 25–26.
19 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 24.
20 H.-H. Hoppe, A Theory..., p. 166.
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terintuitive or idiosyncratic way, so that 
‘aggression’, as they mean it, covers both 
interpersonal bodily violence and theft or 
trespass against other owned resources. 
In their elaborations they say that we 
oppose aggression against the bodies or 
property of other people”21. Moreover, 
not each act of violence is aggressive. For 
an act to be an aggressive act, it has to 
initiate violence against other people and 
their property without their consent. 
Now it is clearly visible that both 
intellectual property in general and 
copyright in particular are instances of 
aggression. They initiate invasion of le-
gitimate property of individuals who 
either homesteaded it or acquired it 
through free exchange. This aggressive 
violence concerns both persons’ bodies 
and external tangible property. A copy-
right holder is allowed to violently stop 
legitimate self-owners against their will 
from employing their hands, vocal cords, 
brains etc. to the extent his copyright 
stretches. Similarly, a copyright holder 
is allowed to violently stop other people 
against their will from using their com-
puters, printers, paper, ink etc. to the 
extent his copyright stretches. In this 
sense and to this extent a copyright 
holder becomes an owner of other peo-
ple’s bodies and their tangible property. 
As far as the fi rst type of infringement is 
concerned, copyright and other kinds of 
intellectual property rights verge on slav-
ery – possessing other people, though to 
a very small extent. In the second case, 
they constitute theft. Again, libertarian 
theory gets it right: “Copyright and pat-
ent grants of privilege are another form 
21 S. Kinsella, Libertarian Legal Theory, 
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of property infringement — courtesy of 
the state. While they have their origins in 
a much earlier privilege given to ‘friends 
of the crown’, in their modern incarna-
tion they blend in with the welfare state’s 
wealth-distributing impetus. Far from 
being ‘natural’ property rights grounded 
in the common law, patent and copyright 
are monopoly privileges granted solely 
by state legislation (…) The mere act of 
creation — composing a song, penning 
a novel or inventing a mousetrap — gives 
the creator control over the tangible 
property of others. In addition to allow-
ing the author partially to control the 
paper, ink, computer and photocopies of 
others, copyright in particular restricts 
not only our rights to our property, but 
to our very bodies (…) Patent and copy-
right clearly undermine private property. 
A staunch defense of private property 
must lead to anti-intellectual-property 
conclusions”22. 
4. Conclusions
In this paper I provided arguments in 
favour of the thesis that copyright is an 
instance of aggression. My line of argu-
ment was based on the theory developed 
by Stephan Kinsella and political philos-
ophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Deriving 
from this Austro-libertarian tradition, 
I demonstrated that since a copyright 
holder becomes an illegitimate owner of 
other people’s bodies and tangible prop-
erty, copyright means expropriation, 
redistribution and thereby aggression. 
For norms of conduct, theories of justice 
and freedom included, to work and stay 
coherent, they have to solve confl icts 
22 I. Mercer, S. Kinsella, Do Patents and 





over scarce resources. If a given norm 
of conduct, for instance copyright, itself 
produces scarcity where there was none 
before, confl icts and inconsistencies will 
result. The costs of such mistaken norms 
and theories are then paid by these peo-
ple whose property and freedom is vio-
lated, often with the full sanction of the 
state.
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